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Dueling Federations:  U.S. Labor in 2006 
Richard W. Hurd1 
 
 
 
 Seven unions with six million members formed the Change to Win federation in 2005, 
leaving the AFL-CIO with nine million members. 
 
 Neither dire predictions of open warfare nor optimistic scenarios of immediate growth 
have proved accurate; union density is relatively stable, and the two federations are 
learning how to coexist peacefully. 
 
 There has been a marked increase in strategic cooperation among national unions, 
most notably within the CTW, but also through AFL-CIO Industrial Coordinating 
Committees. 
 
 The CTW is sponsoring a number of large-scale organizing campaigns, and several 
AFL-CIO unions have increased organizing expenditures substantially; to date the 
results have been modest. 
 
 The two federations are cooperating for the 2006 Congressional elections with the 
AFL-CIO taking the lead. 
 
 The best hope for the future is that the labor movement will ultimately benefit from 
competing models for growth. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Labor unity in the U.S. lasted exactly half a 
century.  At the convention to celebrate the 
fiftieth anniversary of the 1955 merger of the 
American Federation of Labor with the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, bitter-
ness and rebellion swept away plans of  
 
 
celebration.  On the eve of the August 2005 
event in Chicago, seven major unions 
announced that they would break away from 
the AFL-CIO.  Six weeks later they formally 
established the Change to Win federation, 
spawning both proclamations of labor’s 
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rebirth and simultaneous warnings of the 
movement’s destruction.  
 
Ten years before the rupture John Sweeney 
had headed a challenge to the entrenched 
leadership of the AFL-CIO.  He was elected 
President of the federation in 1995 on a 
platform that emphasized structural change 
and identified organizing as the top priority.  
His victory generated an extraordinary level 
of enthusiasm among progressive unionists 
and their allies in academic and political 
circles.  With Sweeney at the helm and his 
union the SEIU (service employees) leading 
the way, it seemed that organized labor was 
poised for a remarkable reversal of fortunes. 
 
But Sweeney’s efforts to reorient the AFL-
CIO’s seventy national unions were 
unsuccessful, and the election of the arch 
conservative George W. Bush as President 
of the U.S. in 2000 deepened labor’s woes.  
With union density continuing to decline at 
the same rate as before 1995, opposition to 
Sweeney emerged, ironically led by Andy 
Stern who succeeded him as President of 
SEIU.  In the summer of 2003 Stern joined 
with four other union presidents to form the 
New Unity Partnership (NUP), which origi-
nally pushed for change within the AFL-CIO.  
This loose-knit group embraced a framework 
for reform that echoed Sweeney’s earlier cry 
for increased resources devoted to orga-
nizing.  The NUP also proposed restruc-
turing through mergers designed to promote 
consolidation based on industry in order to 
enhance bargaining power.   
 
The proposals stimulated debate, but serious 
consideration of reform was postponed so 
that all of labor could join forces in an effort 
to replace George Bush as President.  When 
the political effort fell short and Bush was 
reelected in November, 2004, the NUP 
unions immediately went on the offensive.  
Most notably, the SEIU released a refined 
restructuring plan that would give the AFL-
CIO authority to force mergers, reducing the 
number of unions from seventy to no more 
than twenty, each with a clearly defined 
industrial jurisdiction.  The proposal also set 
mandatory targets for the organizing 
expenditures of the AFL-CIO affiliates.  At 
this juncture the NUP unions were joined by 
three others, most notably the Teamsters; 
shortly thereafter they adopted a new name, 
the Change to Win coalition (CTW). 
Throughout the first half of 2005 the CTW 
unions not only pushed their restructuring 
agenda, but also called for ousting of John 
Sweeney as AFL-CIO President. 
 
The reform proposals were dismissed as 
insulting by labor leaders who embraced the 
tradition of national union autonomy on 
strategic issues related to bargaining, orga-
nizing, and internal governance.  It was not 
just traditionalists who were angry; several 
national leaders widely respected for their 
progressive views and support for innovation 
also attacked the plan.  These union officials 
endorsed the importance of allocating sub-
stantial resources to organizing but rejected 
the overall reform agenda, arguing for the 
necessity to devote equal attention to poli-
tical initiatives.  They also attacked the re-
structuring idea as top-down engineering that 
would undermine union democracy.  It be-
came clear weeks in advance of the 2005 
AFL-CIO convention that John Sweeney 
retained enough support to win on any key 
votes and to be reelected.  When the CTW 
realized that its reform proposals would be 
defeated, its key members announced that 
they would withdraw from the AFL-CIO.  On 
September 27, 2005, the new Change to Win 
federation held its founding convention in St. 
Louis.   
 
Contrasting Expectations 
 
In the aftermath of the formal split, there was 
great distress among the unions that 
retained allegiance to the AFL-CIO.  The lea-
ders of the CTW unions were described as 
arrogant and self-serving and were denoun-
ced for undermining union solidarity.  There 
were dire warnings of raids by CTW unions 
to steal members from AFL-CIO affiliates, 
and deep concern that the movement would 
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be divided at the state and local level under-
mining mutual support and cooperation on 
political campaigns.  More practically, the de-
parture of unions accounting for approxi-
mately one-third of the AFL-CIO’s member-
ship forced budget cuts that affected all 
aspects of the federation’s operation. 
 
While the AFL-CIO scrambled to reorganize 
and refocus, the CTW unions began to 
develop a coordinated strategy to pursue a 
growth agenda.  At its founding convention, 
the new federation selected Anna Burger of 
SEIU as Chair and Edgar Romney of UNITE-
HERE (needletrades and hotels) as Vice 
Chair.  Burger became the first woman to 
lead a U.S. labor federation, and Romney 
became the first African American to serve at 
such a high level of federation leadership. 
 
The CTW unions projected a determined 
optimism.  They argued that by shifting sub-
stantial resources to organizing, conducting 
joint campaigns where appropriate, and 
promoting strategic support among members 
of the coalition, CTW would pave the way for 
growth.  The CTW unions pronounced their 
intent to target for organizing only those 
industries that cannot export jobs, primarily 
in the service sector, transportation, and 
construction.  They declared that they had no 
desire to fight with the AFL-CIO and would 
be content to build power in those industries 
already within their core jurisdictions.  Also, 
the key leaders of CTW publicly voiced 
opposition to raiding. 
 
After a relatively brief period of acrimony, the 
two federations negotiated an agreement 
that allows locals of CTW unions to apply for 
“solidarity charters.”  The charters assure 
that the locals will have full rights of 
participation in municipal labor councils and 
state labor federations affiliated with the 
AFL-CIO. 
 
AFL-CIO Strategy 2006 
 
A year after the split, it is clear that the AFL-
CIO has deemphasized its role in the 
organizing arena.  Organizing is still a priori-
ty, but national unions control all funding and 
strategic decisions.  In his Labor Day press 
conference John Sweeney announced that 
four key affiliates have increased their 
organizing budget by a total of $100 million.  
Meanwhile, the AFL-CIO itself has reasona-
bly decided to concentrate primarily on politi-
cal action.  A centerpiece of the political ef-
fort is its Voice@Work campaign for labor 
law reform, which promotes the long-term 
objectives embodied in proposed federal 
legislation.  The Employee Free Choice Act 
would establish union certification based on 
signed authorization cards, provide for arbi-
tration in bargaining for first contracts, and 
increase penalties for employer unfair labor 
practices violations.  As of October 1, 2006, 
the bill has been endorsed by 260 members 
of Congress — a majority of those in the 
House of Representatives and close to half 
of those in the Senate. 
 
The federation also has initiated an asso-
ciate membership program, Working Ameri-
ca, to establish a communication link to wor-
kers who support labor’s political philosophy 
but who are not currently union members.  
Working America was created in the leadup 
to the 2004 election and currently claims 
nearly 1.5 million subscribers.  Like 
Voice@Work, this project is directly integral 
to the federation’s political program.  The 
most impressive aspect of the AFL-CIO’s 
leadership role in the political arena is its 
remarkable effort to influence the 2006 
election.  In spite of the defection of the CTW 
unions, the AFL-CIO has managed to 
allocate $40 million to mobilization for the 
2006 campaign, up approximately one-third 
from its expenditures in the most recent mid-
term election four years ago.  By all indi-
cations, the effort in the field has not been 
adversely affected.  In fact, the CTW has 
agreed to cooperate with the AFL-CIO, and 
the more established federation retains its 
role as leader of labor’s political action 
program. 
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In addition to politics, another key initiative of 
the AFL-CIO is the formation of Industry 
Coordinating Committees (ICC).  The ICCs 
are designed to coordinate bargaining and 
organizing activities among unions with sub-
stantial membership in a particular industry.  
The idea originally was suggested during the 
fight with CTW as an alternative to manda-
tory mergers.  There are currently three ICCs 
in operation, with more on the drawing 
board.  The first ICC was formed in October 
2005, bringing together unions in the arts, 
entertainment, media, and information indus-
tries.  The other ICCs are for unions repre-
senting nurses (RNs Working Together), and 
for unions of state and local government 
employees.  Although it is too early to assess 
the impact of ICCs, they have provided a 
venue for strategic coordination and cross-
fertilization thereby strengthening ties among 
AFL-CIO affiliates.  The most important as-
pects of the state and local government 
ICC’s agenda is a targeted campaign to 
expand bargaining rights for public em-
ployees in states that do not have com-
prehensive labor laws.  This effort dovetails 
with the AFL-CIO’s political program. 
 
CTW Strategy 2006 
 
CTW unions subscribe to a growth agenda 
based on organizing.  They embrace an 
approach that includes reallocation of re-
sources on a grand scale away from other 
union activities and to recruitment.  The parti-
cipating unions have agreed that 75 percent 
of the CTW budget should be devoted to 
organizing, and that each affiliate will maxi-
mize resources for organizing.  Each union 
accepts responsibility for organizing in its 
own industry.  The primary role of CTW is to 
sponsor joint campaigns by pairs of affiliated 
unions, and to initiate new campaigns that 
are too big for a single union.   
Current joint campaigns include SEIU and 
the Teamsters who are partnering to recruit 
school bus drivers, SEIU with UNITE-HERE 
in general service contracting, and the 
Teamsters with UNITE-HERE in industrial 
laundries.  In addition, UFCW (food and 
commercial) and UNITE-HERE will jointly co-
ordinate certain retail organizing campaigns, 
and LIUNA (laborers) and UBC (carpenters) 
will work together on major construction 
industry organizing.  The best example of a 
campaign that is too large for any one union 
is Wake Up WalMart, a public awareness 
campaign to highlight the leading retailer’s 
excesses.  
 
The overriding strategy is to target for orga-
nizing activity only those industries that will 
remain in the U.S., primarily in health care, 
hospitality, retail, building services, trans-
portation, and construction.  In order to pro-
mote full cooperation, the presidents of the 
unions hold bi-weekly conference calls and 
monthly meetings.  In addition, the unions’ 
organizing directors, campaign directors, and 
political directors meet regularly to share 
strategic plans and seek input on campaign 
planning.  There is a high degree of energy, 
commitment, and excitement about working 
together to build market power through ag-
gressive organizing.  Although organizing is 
the top priority, the unions also support each 
other on major bargaining campaigns.   
 
The CTW is also looking to build global 
partnerships with unions in other countries in 
support of organizing where a key employer 
is a multinational corporation.  Andy Stern 
has established an informal global organizing 
alliance that includes key union leaders from 
at least a dozen countries.  Several CTW 
campaigns have global connections, inclu-
ding the school bus drivers’ campaign which 
is targeting a British company and a 
UFCW/UNITE-HERE retail, apparel, and dis-
tribution initiative. 
 
There is consensus among CTW leaders 
that political action will pay dividends in the 
short term only if tied directly to strategic 
leverage to support specific campaigns or 
pave the way for organizing.  Although parti-
cipating alongside the AFL-CIO nationally for 
the 2006 elections, the CTW is running its 
own field operations in Michigan, Ohio, and 
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Pennsylvania in the hopes of electing labor-
friendly governors. 
 
For now the CTW denies any interest in 
adding new unions to the federation.  Any 
prospective member will have to embrace 
the CTW organizing commitment, accepts its 
strategic campaign focus, and limit its activi-
ties to assigned jurisdictions. The depth of 
strategic coordination that appears to be 
emerging from the CTW is atypical and has 
not been seen in the U.S. since the early 
years of the CIO in the late 1930s. 
  
The Potential for Revitalization with a 
Divided Labor Movement 
 
Strategically the CTW framework for growth 
appears to hold promise, and the AFL-CIO is 
making progress in creating a new identity 
and sense of purpose among its affiliates.  
The best hope for immediate success lies 
with CTW-coordinated organizing cam-
paigns.  Hotel Workers Rising, an effort 
sponsored by CTW and coordinated by 
UNITE-HERE, has secured neutrality agree-
ments from Hilton Hotels and other major 
corporations in the industry, and the union 
appears poised for substantial growth.  If 
other CTW campaigns achieve similar re-
sults, the new federation will begin to gain 
momentum.  Ideally this would stimulate 
unions in the AFL-CIO to rally behind alter-
native models for growth that are compelling 
and are pursued with clarity and unity of 
purpose.  Perhaps consensus could be 
reached to embrace a competing model 
based on a re-energized application of poli-
tical unionism, or one that constructs a 
modern-day interpretation of occupational 
unionism.   
 
The AFL-CIO unions have moved beyond 
their initial distress with the split, and now 
need to build positive momentum that 
speaks to workers not attracted to the CTW 
industrial/sectoral framework.  Public sector 
workers would likely prefer some form of 
political unionism, while the expanding pro-
fessional and technical workforce would be a 
natural fit with occupational unionism.  Re-
cognizing the potential, the AFL-CIO De-
partment for Professional Employees has 
initiated strategic dialogue among its affi-
liates and through this process is exploring 
alternatives to traditional collective bargain-
ing, as well as political options for addressing 
the workplace concerns of the growing con-
tingent white collar workforce. Ultimately, the 
future of the U.S. labor movement will de-
pend not only on the CTW’s fortunes but also 
on the ability of other unions to adapt to the 
21st century with their own growth agenda.  
Ironically, it may be competition between the 
two federations that creates the dynamic 
energy required to spur union revitalization. 
 
Unfortunately, the future path is not clear and 
there are numerous obstacles to resurgence.  
Globalization, the hostile political environ-
ment that will surely continue well beyond 
the Bush presidency, and the broad neo-
liberal policies embraced by both U.S. poli-
tical parties will combine to thwart many 
union initiatives.  The AFL-CIO has taken 
some initial steps to openly challenge the 
neoliberal agenda, and this needs to con-
tinue if labor hopes to push the Democratic 
Party to the left.  Inside of the labor move-
ment there is still some danger that com-
petition between the federations will dege-
nerate into open warfare with raiding and, 
even more likely, an inability to coordinate 
strategy across the chasm.  Finally, there is 
no evidence that the CTW growth agenda 
can succeed, since even those unions within 
the new federation that have been devoting 
substantive resources to organizing for over 
a decade (SEIU and UNITE-HERE) have 
had only modest success at increasing den-
sity in core jurisdictions.  The newcomers to 
the strategic organizing framework, espe-
cially the Teamsters and the UFCW, need to 
go through a difficult period of radical orga-
nizational change in order to build the foun-
dation for long-term growth. 
 
In spite of the pitfalls, the current controversy 
has at least stirred unions into action.  The 
U.S. labor movement continues to face the 
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real possibility of irrelevancy and even ex-
tinction.  Given their former strength, it may 
be surprising that the American unions have 
to fear for their futures.  However, the globa-
lized economy and anti-union policies have 
significantly contributed to the crisis of the 
unions in the U.S.2  The share of the private 
sector work force that is unionized fell from 
more than 20 percent in 1980 to less than 8 
percent in 2005.  Additionally, the unions that 
continue to exist have far less power due to 
changed tactics by employers, who can fire 
the leaders of organizing drives more easily.  
Radical transformation is crucial for labor 
movement revival and, with the CTW serving 
as catalyst (or antagonist depending on your 
perspective), there is finally the possibility 
that unions will find a way to adapt and 
ultimately will create strategic approaches 
that deliver voice, power, and leverage in the 
context of the evolving global economy. 
 
 
Washington, DC  
December 4, 2006 
 
 
                                            
 
1 Richard W. Hurd is Professor of Industrial and Labor 
Relations at Cornell University. 
2 See also Baker, Dean, “Increasing Inequality in the 
United States”, Fokus Amerika 5, 2006: Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation 
